An institutional approach to balancing international monetary relations : the case for a US-China settlement facility by Piffaretti, Nadia F. & Rossi, Sergio
Policy Research Working Paper 5188
An Institutional Approach 
to Balancing International Monetary Relations






















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5188
Management of international monetary relations between 
China and the United States will be one of the crucial 
parameters for the stability or instability of the global 
financial system in the next decade. Although most of the 
literature suggests rebalancing through either adjustment 
of relative prices or adjustment of behavior in both 
countries, this paper explores an institutional approach 
This paper—a product of the Development Economics Vice Presidency—is part of a larger effort in the department to 
better understand the global economic crisis and its implications for development policies. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at npiffaretti@worldbank.org.  
to rebalancing. Applying the lessons from Keynes’ 1944 
plan for a United States-United Kingdom international 
clearing union, the paper explores the creation of a 
bilateral United States-China settlement facility as an 
institutional contribution to the structural rebalancing of 
global imbalances. 
 
An Institutional Approach to 
Balancing International Monetary Relations: 










University of Fribourg 
Chair of Macroeconomics 













Keywords: international monetary relations, reserve currencies, US–China relations. 
JEL classification codes: B22, E42, E58, F02, F33, F53, N10.
                                                           
* Corresponding author (npiffaretti@worldbank.org).  2 
 
Introduction 
The aftermath of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis is fostering intense 
debate on the international monetary and financial architecture, from which two main 
points seem to emerge: 
-  The long domination of the US dollar as the major international currency, 
started after WWII, is coming to an end, and the global economy has 
entered an uncharted and possibly long period of transition to a 
fragmented multi-polar  system, which is likely to elicit international 
monetary instability.
1
-  Coordinated external and internal rebalancing of the US and Chinese 
economies will be key for future stability of the global economy.
 
2
Accordingly, management of international monetary relations between China and the 
United States will be a crucial parameter for the stability or instability of the global 
financial system in the next decade. 
 
This paper departs from existing analyses on rebalancing the global economy 
in two ways. Current literature on addressing global imbalances advocates rebalancing 
either through relative prices (that is, exchange rates) or through change in behavior 
                                                           
1 The fall of the pound sterling occurred during the 1920–1940 interwar period. New estimates 
put forward by Eichengreen and Flandreau (2008) show that contrary to most accounts, the US 
dollar and the pound sterling alternated themselves as main reserve currency. The interwar 
period was indeed characterized by great international monetary instability (Eichengreen 
1991), owing to lack of international cooperation, unwillingness by the raising power (the 
United States) to assume full international monetary leadership, and structural shortcomings of 
the reserve currency system. 
2 See Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) on the dangers of “remaining in midstream”. 3 
 
(notably, consumption and saving patterns).
3
The internal and external rebalancing of the US and Chinese economies needs 
to be framed beyond the narrow view of an adjustment of relative prices through 
modification of the relevant exchange rates. In light of the magnitude of the existing 
imbalances, even a gradual re-alignment of the relevant exchange rates would amount 
to an overall adjustment of great magnitude carried out in a relatively short period of 
time. A substantial depreciation of the US dollar against a number of currencies, 
accompanied by a substantial appreciation of the yuan against the US dollar, would 
set in motion strong dynamics  that might act negatively on the pace of current 
economic recovery, and may generate further imbalances within the global economy. 
A too dramatic rebalancing of the relations between the US economy and the rest of 
the world, and an appreciation of the yuan with respect to the US dollar, could 
precipitate the exchange rate of the latter, leaving the global economy de facto without 
a risk-free liquid asset. 
 This paper explores a third, institutional 
approach, through the design of the international monetary architecture. Further, 
while the current literature focuses on (coordinated) asymmetrical rebalancing by the 
countries involved, this paper points out the interest in adopting schemes of 
symmetrical rebalancing. Indeed, adjustments at only one side of global imbalances 
are bound to have destabilizing effects: on one hand, a unilateral substantial decrease 
of spending in deficit countries (namely, in the United States) could potentially move 
debtor countries towards  a depression (Wolf 2009); on the other hand, failure to 
address fiscal sustainability in deficit countries might set the stage for the next 
financial crisis. 
                                                           
3 See Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) for discussion of scenarios leading to behavioural-
driven adjustment of global imbalances. 4 
 
In this respect, Lin (2009) points out the structural nature of the US–China 
imbalances, stressing the simplistic nature of solutions mainly driven by a change in 
relative prices, and argues for a resolution through progressive deep structural reforms 
on all sides of the global imbalances. Lin’s (2009) proposal, however, also amounts to 
an overall economic adjustment of great magnitude to be carried out in a relatively 
short period of time. This paper argues that a reform of the international monetary and 
financial architecture to introduce a symmetric rebalancing mechanism would support 
such a coordinated structural adjustment. The first section considers current 
imbalances between China and the United States in the international framework of 
global trade. The second section brings forward the importance of a sound 
international monetary architecture for avoiding substantial external imbalances, and 
the third section briefly reviews recent proposals to give a prominent role to Special 
Drawing Rights. The fourth section proposes a settlement facility between China and 
the United States as a first step to improve the structure of international payments. The 
last section concludes, summarizing the requirements for such a facility to operate in 
order to rebalance foreign trade bilaterally as well as multilaterally. 
1.  The US–China Imbalances in the Context of Changing Patterns of Global 
Trade 
Global imbalances have been rising substantially in the last decade, from less 
than 1% of world total output in 1998 to 3% in 2008, with the recent slowdown in 
accumulation linked to the consequences of the global financial crisis on both trade 
flows and world output. Surprisingly, there is no consensus view on the origins and 
nature of current global imbalances. The origins of imbalances have been attributed to 
manipulation of yuan exchange rates (Geithner 2009), the existence of a global 5 
 
savings glut (Bernanke 2005), and the exchange-rate policy response of Asian 
countries after the 1997–1998 Asian crisis (Aizenman and Lee 2007, Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2007, Obstfeld et al. 2008, Park and Shin 2009). Dooley et al. (2003) point to 
the export-oriented strategy of many Asian economies, accompanied by the 
underdevelopment of financial markets in emerging countries, which fuelled a surplus 
of savings directed to more mature financial markets. A number of authors
4
Global imbalances have originated within a rapidly changing context of 
international relations and a shifting distribution in global economic activity (Quah 
2009). China’s current account balance between 1982 and 2002 has constantly been 
barely positive, never reaching beyond 1.5% of its GDP. From 2003, China’s current 
account surplus raised every year to 2.8%, 3.6%, 7.2%, to peak at 11% of its GDP in 
2007. The economic raise of China goes well beyond its relation with the United 
States. Within Asia itself, one notices important shifts: while China has grown to 
become the main trading partner of both Japan and Korea, the part of Japan and Korea 
in the overall volume of Chinese trade has been decreasing. As every major country 
intensifies its trade relations with China, the latter country is differentiating its own 
trade relations. This also holds for the trade relation between China and the United 
States, as China’s share of US imports has steadily increased (to 13% in 2008), while 
China’s overall exports to the United States have declined from 22% (in 2003) to 18% 
(in 2007). 
 identified 
the origins of these imbalances in excessive consumption expenditures in the United 
States mirrored by very high saving rates in China. 
                                                           
4 See Rajan (2006) and Roach (2006) for the origins of this argument. 6 
 
On the other side of the Pacific, US trade relations have grown increasingly 
unbalanced: in 2008, the US trade deficit reached the level of the GDP of India. It is 
within this context that trade relations between China and the United States have 
substantially grown, since 2005, into the current strongly enduring imbalanced 
pattern. The US imbalance, however, is a phenomenon going beyond the US–China 
trade relation: the US trade imbalance has increased not only towards China – starting 
from 2003 – but towards the European Union and oil-exporting countries as well. The 
imbalance against the latter two trade partners mirrors the amount of the US trade 
deficit against China. 
However, the astounding pace at which the trade imbalance between China 
and the United States has been evolving since 2003 has raised concerns, and fuelled 
calls for significant adjustments of the exchange rate between the US dollar and the 
yuan, despite the latter has been appreciating 21% from 2005 to 2008 with respect to 
the former. 
In the United States, saving has been sharply declining since 2000, owing to 
an increase in both private and public spending. On the other hand, the low pre-crisis 
level of the US dollar exchange rate, and the sharp rise of oil prices have exacerbated 
the US current account deficit. China’s 2003 sharp rise of the overall saving rate (from 
40% to around 52% of its GDP) is in stark contrast with overconsumption in the 
United States. The well-known parsimonious attitude of Chinese households, 
supported by a high level of precautionary saving owing to an insufficient level of 
social protection, cannot alone explain the high saving rate, as Chinese households 
saving rate (around 18%) is not uncharacteristically high, and household saving as a 
proportion to total income has not risen at all in the past two decades. The main driver 7 
 
of excess saving in China, in fact, has been the local corporate sector, in particular 
large corporations. Gross corporate savings in China have increased to more than 26% 
of GDP in 2007 from 15% a decade earlier. Lin (2009) suggests that such a high 
saving rate of local large corporations is due to inefficiencies in the Chinese financial 
sector, mostly formed by large banks. This sector is not tailored to finance investment 
by small or medium-sized enterprises, and ought therefore to be reformed before long. 
High gross corporate savings are however seldom originated by inefficiencies 
in the financial sector. As corporate savings are formed out of non-invested profits, a 
key issue is to identify the drivers of the accumulation of profits. As Anderson (2009) 
points out, gross corporate savings are formed by profits earned on markets abroad, 
hence part of Chinese saving is not originating in the domestic economy but in foreign 
trade. While gross profits as a share of total revenues have been stable in China, their 
ratio as a share of GDP has increased very sharply since 2002, against the backdrop of 
doubling industrial sales revenues with respect to GDP over the 2002–2009 period, 
driven by steel, basic materials, and machineries. Industrial-sector data indicates that 
corporate profits have boomed, rising steadily from 2% of GDP to above 10% in 
2007, driven by expanding market shares. This is a pattern similar to increased saving 
observed in oil-exporting countries over the same period of time. 
As a result, China’s internal imbalance is directly caused by the external flow 
of trade on product markets. An adjustment of the yuan exchange rate would reduce 
gross profit earnings and, indeed, saving in China. However, the magnitude of the 
adjustment required in that respect would amount to an important decrease in the 
volume of foreign trade, at a time when the global economy is already suffering from 
excess capacity. 8 
 
While reduction of the amount of gross corporate savings would reduce 
China’s current account surplus, so would an increase in spending of corporate profits 
on investment goods, with the difference that the latter would adjust the volume of 
foreign trade upwards rather than reducing it. 
Adoption of policies to increase investment of Chinese corporate profits 
earned in foreign trade would be a most effective tool, under present circumstances, to 
reduce domestic imbalances in China. Yet, these profits being earned in US dollars, 
the current international monetary architecture does not encourage spending them in 
imports through foreign investment. 
2.  Monetary Architecture Matters 
Despite the centrality of the US–China financial relationship, the US trade 
imbalance against the European Union and oil-exporting countries is at least as high 
as the US trade deficit against China, pointing to the United States as the main origin 
of the overall imbalance in foreign trade. Running large trade deficits has become a 
structural feature of the US economy in the last decade, reflecting the financial 
excesses that led to the 2007–2009 financial crisis. While the origin of this trend is 
linked to the systematic US overconsumption pattern stimulated by very low domestic 
interest rates and excessive expectations on higher assets prices, it cannot explain 
alone the reasons that have led this pattern to evolve to such impressive proportions 
without generating a counterbalancing adjustment.
5
                                                           
5  As current imbalances do not reflect difference in productivity levels,  market exchange 
should tend to adjust, limiting the scope of imbalances. 
  The US dollar status as the 
world’s foremost reserve currency has played a significant role in enabling the 
financing of the US external deficit beyond what would be sustainable levels for other 9 
 
advanced countries, and allowed the United States to be able to finance during the last 
decade its mounting current account deficits by borrowing abroad almost limitless and 
at very low interest rates. 
As a result, while the US and Chinese economies remain largely not strongly 
interdependent  commercially  (their bilateral trade accounts indeed for only 3% of 
world trade), the global role of the deficit country’s currency has provided a major 
financial interconnection between China and the United States, with China’s external 
imbalance financing part of the US internal imbalance. 
The current design of the international monetary architecture structured 
around a core (the United States) and a periphery (namely, Asia and the European 
Union) allows for international imbalances to build up so long as the periphery 
supports accumulation of US dollar-denominated debt. The use of national currencies 
in international transactions allows for foreign trade imbalances to develop 
unchecked. While within any countries the existence of central bank clearing and 
interbank settlement procedures strongly limits monetary imbalances between banks, 
at international level national central banks can accumulate very substantial amounts 
of foreign-exchange reserves, if creditor countries are willing to continue accumulate 
debt claims. The global role of the US dollar has granted the United States a limitless 
borrowing privilege from the rest of the world, which finances the relevant flows with 
profits earned in foreign trade by oil exporters, Chinese corporations, and other 
countries’ businesses. Denominated in US dollars, these profits have given rise to 
external saving, thereby maintaining total saving in China at a very high level, and 
financing excess consumption in the United States. 10 
 
While the US dollar still retains its global role, the above pattern is likely to 
continue unless the structural issues of overconsumption in the United States and the 
excessive external saving of Chinese corporations are addressed altogether in a 
process of coordinated adjustment. Policies of rebalancing would imply, however, a 
reduction of trade flows between China and the United States, and would  have 
therefore a negative effect on the global economy, at a time when economic growth is 
still lagging in a world economy that presents substantial excess capacity. 
On the other hand, shifting away from the global role of the US dollar would 
cause a large capital loss on China’s accumulated stock of holdings in the United 
States. For these reasons, as pointed out by Dooley et al. (2003), Asian countries still 
very much have the interest to support “Bretton Woods 2”, which amounts to betting 
on the likelihood that the US dollar will continue playing its global role, despite the 
evident imbalances that this generates in the global economy. Nonetheless, as noted 
by Prasad and Gu (2009), this regime remains highly unstable, and its equilibrium is 
more similar to the “balance of financial terror” described by Summers (2006) than to 
an equilibrium generated by (foreign-exchange) market forces. 
There is now a widespread consensus about the need to reverse the process of 
accumulation of global imbalances, and worry that the post-crisis desire of self-
insurance may be permanently increased, potentially leading to further accumulation 
of foreign-exchange reserves, setting thus the stage for a continuation of the current 
disequilibria. 
While the US–China imbalance needs to be framed into the broader context of 
geo-economical shifts of power across the globe, and cannot be separated from the 
pattern of overconsumption in the US economy, any major adjustment of global 11 
 
imbalances cannot avoid addressing the US–China imbalance itself. Hence, any global 
solution would depend on coordinated reforms between China and the United States 
on what Prasad and Gu (2009) suggestively describe as “the tightening embrace 
between the two countries”. 
A major obstacle in the process of adjustment resides, however, in the very 
same feature of the current international monetary architecture that  has allowed 
imbalances to grow unchecked – namely, the asymmetrical nature of international 
payments in a key-currency regime – which is also the institutional feature that makes 
rebalancing particularly difficult, as the issuing country runs external deficits to meet 
growing demand for reserve assets from the rest of the world. The key drawback of 
the current international monetary architecture is the lack of an institutional setting 
that can allow for smooth symmetric rebalancing of both debtor and creditor countries 
alike. As the Governor of People’s Bank of China pointed out recently, this would not 
be the case if back in 1944 countries had adopted Keynes’ bancor (Zhou 2009). 
Keynes’ 1941 Plan for an International Currency Union stemmed from the 
idea that monetary architecture matters, and that the post-WWII growing flows of 
foreign trade would have been best supported by an  international monetary and 
payment facility. Setting up an international clearing union, with binding rules and 
proper incentives to contain the level  of imbalances in both debtor and creditor 
countries, was meant to avoid both the difficulty and the recessionary effects of 
rebalancing through the traditional adjustment on the debtor country side only, which 
had plagued the international monetary system in the interwar period. The key feature 
of Keynes’ plan was a mechanism of quotas and incentives to encourage surplus 
countries to spend their net earnings from foreign trade on imports from any deficit 12 
 
countries, instead of allowing these earnings to accumulate as external saving 
financing internal imbalances in deficit countries. The operational goal of the 
proposed international facility  was “the clearing and settlement of the ultimate 
outstanding balances between central banks” (Keynes 1980: 125), each of them acting 
on behalf of its own country for the settlement of foreign trade transactions. Within 
the framework of the current  modern payment systems’ mechanisms that operate 
domestically  on a real-time gross-settlement basis, this amounts to setting up an 
international settlement institution issuing the means of final payment used by central 
banks for foreign transactions of participating countries. The use of this means of final 
payment would be reserved to settlement between participating central banks of any 
international transactions. Any amounts of bancor being issued for and circulating 
between central banks only –  within the international settlement facility  through 
which participating central banks would be connected –  the  bancor would not 
circulate for payments between private parties, remaining thereby out of reach for 
foreign-exchange market transactions involving “private individuals, businesses and 
banks other than central banks” (Keynes 1980: 168). Transactions among individual 
agents would continue to be carried out in any national currencies of choice, with the 
official exchange rates established between the national central banks participating to 
the international settlement facility providing a benchmark towards which exchange 
rates established on foreign-exchange markets will tend as a result of the incentives 
within the international settlement facility. The arbitrage process will notably make 
sure that a growing share of foreign trade is paid through the international settlement 
facility – granting exchange-rates stability (see Rossi 2009) – thereby reducing the 
influence on exchange rates from foreign-exchange markets as time goes by. 13 
 
It is the legacy of Keynes’ idea of asking an international monetary institution 
to issue supranational bank money for the settlement of foreign trade transactions 
between national central banks that inspired in 1967 delegates at the annual meeting 
of the IMF to set up the Special Drawing Right (SDR) facility. Yet, SDRs were not 
conceived as new supranational means of payment, but as a conduit to a number of 
national currencies within a basket named after the SDR. Most importantly,  the 
introduction of the SDR has not been associated with the symmetrical set of incentives 
for rebalancing which constitutes a central feature of Keynes’ plan. 
A reform of the international monetary architecture through SDRs would in 
fact require a change in their nature and issuance mechanism. Currently issued by ad 
hoc one-off allocations to supplement the needs for foreign-exchange reserves of IMF 
member countries, to date SDRs do not represent liabilities of the IMF: they are 
simply a right for any deficit countries to borrow multilaterally a number of deposits 
denominated in national (key) currencies, which therefore continue to be used as 
international reserve assets as pointed out above. 
3.  An SDR’s Renewal? 
Recently, SDRs have received much renewed attention, in particular after 
authoritative PBoC’s Governor Zhou (2009) called for a supranational reserve 
currency, and prospected a new role for SDRs in the post-crisis international monetary 
architecture. The resurgence of interest in SDRs has given rise to markedly diverse 
proposals for SDRs reforms, each aimed at addressing different shortcomings of the 
current system, namely (i) action on the demand side, (ii) insurance against exchange-
rates risk, and (iii) creation of a global derivative to substitute demand of US dollar-
denominated assets. 14 
 
Extending the SDR allocation to a pre-determined pace of issuance would 
have some effects to reduce official precautionary holdings of reserves currencies, by 
increasing access to unconditional resources, and acting more on the demand side of 
currencies than on the supply side (IMF 2009). Some suggestions are aimed at 
developing the SDR into an instrument that could support crisis management, building 
on the 1970s and 1980s discussion around the possible role of the IMF as international 
lender of last resort. In that respect, Cooper (2009) puts  forward the idea of the 
institution of IMF credit lines, with strict rules for their allocation and repayments. 
Others
6
None of the most prominent recent suggestions for a reformed SDR addresses 
the core issue of global imbalances, which would indeed require issuing SDRs as part 
of an institutional scheme of symmetric rebalancing based on international settlements 
for participating central banks. This is surprising in view of the current prominence of 
the issue of imbalances, in particular considering that current account disequilibria 
were one of the issues at the heart of preparatory works for the 1944 Bretton Woods 
conference, notably the UK proposal (Keynes’ plan). 
 view the SDR progressively supplementing national key currencies, provided 
that its liquidity increases massively, possibly through the development of private 
SDR-denominated assets and prominent institutions issuing SDR-denominated debt. 
Such an SDR would essentially be a global derivative instrument (IMF 2009). Less 
far-reaching proposals (Bergsten 2009) put the SDR at the center of a substitution 
account that would allow countries to manage exchange-rates risk better, while 
leaving the rest of the features of the current international monetary architecture 
unchanged. 
                                                           
6 See United Nations (2009). 15 
 
Even if denominated in SDRs, creation of an international clearing system 
would directly mirror the function that national central banks play within their own 
domestic payment and settlement systems, extending to international payments the 
following fundamental features of two-tier banking (see CPSS 2008): 
-  provision of a stable and reliable unit of account and means of payment; 
-  daily settlement procedures that aim at constantly limiting the amount of 
net imbalances between participating banks; 
-  potential function of lender of last resort in case of threatening imbalances 
between participating banks. 
Accordingly, an international settlement system would not aim at enlarging 
the provision of reserve currencies, but would instead aim at providing a system of 
symmetric rebalancing. In that framework, the international monetary facility would 
function as the settlement institution for participating central banks, a function which 
is merely technical and not political (see Rossi 2007). 
While at this stage an SDR-based international settlement facility might still 
lack political realism and support, if the international community were to agree to far-
reaching reforms of the current international monetary architecture, an international 
settlement facility would be both intellectually and practically preferable to reforms 
aimed at making the SDR the dominant reserve asset. Such settlement system would 
rest on a long-established and tested tradition of theory and practice of independent 
and efficient central banking around the world. 16 
 
The remainder of this paper focuses on addressing the current impasse on 
global imbalances  by exploring the creation of a supranational  settlement facility 
between China and the United States. 
4.  An International Settlement Facility between China and the United States 
The path of future reforms might be influenced by the degree of urgency to 
address the rebalancing of the global economy after the 2007–2009 financial crisis, 
characterized by slower economic growth, lower trade flows, high fiscal deficits, and 
ongoing financial fragility. In the absence of a broad international reform, a bilateral 
monetary agreement between China and the United States could represent a stabilizing 
step, and would lie down the foundations of a future broader multilateral monetary 
agreement (Rossi 2009). 
As Mark Twain put it, “history does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” It is 
interesting to observe the parallel between the current economic setting and the 1929–
1944 period, which led to the Bretton Woods agreements eventually. At that time, the 
need to rebalance relations between the United Kingdom and the United States, in the 
context of lagging global economic growth, and the loss of influence of the pound 
sterling in the world economy, led Keynes to suggest a monetary clearing agreement 
between the United States and the United Kingdom, based on a supranational 
monetary unit (the grammor), to set the basis for allowing a smoother rebalancing of 
the US–UK current account imbalance. 
In the spirit of that blueprint, the basis of an agreement between China and the 
United States would consist in setting up a bilateral settlement facility for these two 
countries. In view of the imbalances accumulated thus far, such an agreement would 17 
 
need to  include converting a part of current official holdings of foreign-exchange 
reserves into a new supranational monetary unit. While the unit could be linked to the 
SDR, it does not have necessarily to be so (see Alessandrini and Fratianni 2009). 
Provisions in the agreement would set limits, penalties, and incentives both on debtor 
and  creditor countries, thereby introducing a symmetric rebalancing mechanism 
between China and the United States. On the debtor’s side, US trade deficits against 
China would no longer be freely financed by issuing US domestic-debt instruments, 
while, on the creditor’s side, China would have incentives to spend in trade with the 
United States a relevant part of its external earnings, limiting accumulation of reserves 
to credits on the US–China settlement facility. This would support avoiding payment 
deficits in the United States (Machlup 1963: 256), by increasing commercial exports 
from that country. This would provide a strong incentive for productive investment in 
the US economy, and contribute bridging the gap formed over the last two decades 
owing to delocalization. Indeed another advantage of rebalancing through a bilateral 
settlement facility would be for the United States to increase local production in the 
manufacturing and services sectors where it presents a comparative advantage with 
respect to China,
7
                                                           
7  Elaborated in the aftermath of the Great Depression, Keynes’ plan was meant to be 
expansionary. In the suggested process of rebalancing, China would not need to reduce exports 
to the United States (unlike in the current international setting): it will in fact have an incentive 
to increase imports from the United States. This will not induce closing factories in China, to 
re-open them in the United States (as the current international monetary system would require 
achieving re-balancing). On the contrary, the bilateral settlement facility will provide an 
incentive to increase production in the (highly capital intensive) sectors where the United 
States has a comparative advantage with respect to China. 
 spurring thereby R&D activities, multifactor productivity increases, 
value added creation, and thus real economic growth in the United States. Moreover, 
the bilateral monetary agreement would provide an incentive for reducing US fiscal 
deficits, as the US Treasury would have a very much stronger pressure to find on 18 
 
international financial markets the necessary amount of funds than this is the case to 
date, owing to the international reserve role of the US dollar and forced acceptance by 
China of US Treasury bills, notes, and bonds as a way of increasing returns with 
respect to official foreign-exchange reserves – especially when US policy rates of 
interest are very low. 
Positive balances with the international settlement institution – which will 
correspond to external surpluses of the creditor country – would thereby no longer 
provide any finance to internal imbalances in the debtor country: reserved for foreign 
trade only, these balances would finance commercial and financial purchases in the 
deficit country, as the latter would have the incentives to seek for rebalancing its 
foreign trade beyond reasonable threshold levels for its current account imbalance and 
stock of accumulated external debt (Rossi 2009). 
In such a bilateral settlement system, balances earned in foreign trade will not 
be available on the domestic financial market of the deficit country, but would remain 
available for financing trade with the latter country (notably, imports from it). In that 
framework, China’s trade surplus would no longer correspond to an accumulation of 
US-issued debts, but would  give rise  to  positive balances at the international 
settlement institution. In a nutshell, a settlement facility between China and the United 
States will be mechanically restricted to their central banks, which will thereby use the 
corresponding deposits for settlement of their bilateral foreign trade. Any persistent 
trade deficit will imply for the relevant country a net sale of financial assets to the 
trade surplus country – provided that the latter is willing to buy these assets from the 
former. Analogously to the international scheme suggested by Keynes, no interest 
would be paid on creditor country’s balances at the international settlement institution, 19 
 
whilst an appropriate rate of interest would be charged on positive balances in excess 
of a bilaterally agreed level,
8
The relevant bilateral settlement facility would imply a supranational currency 
unit, which will account for US–China settlement credits (USCSCs). USCSCs would 
be supported by the credibility of the Fed and PBoC, and would be initially limited to 
US–China trade relations. The mechanics of international settlements will work for 
any foreign transactions carried out once the relevant monetary agreement enters into 
force. In view of the current huge amount of foreign-exchange reserves, accumulated 
in particular over the 2003–2008 period, the institution of a bilateral clearing facility 
will need to provide a transition mechanism to reduce these reserves. In that respect, 
two solutions may be put into practice, depending on the political agreement and the 
time horizon that both countries involved are indeed willing to adopt: either a fraction 
of official foreign-exchange reserves accumulated by the creditor country (China) is 
converted into positive balances at the international settlement institution – adopting 
the official exchange rate between the US dollar and the supranational money unit that 
will have to be decided bilaterally between the two countries involved – or the debtor 
country (the United States) is willing as well as able to export an equivalent amount of 
domestic output to the creditor country, which pays the former country in disposing of 
US dollar-denominated bank deposits (that are in its official reserves or in its own 
 as well as on any negative balances with this institution. 
This would provide an incentive for both creditor and debtor countries to reduce the 
amount of imbalances while also stimulating trade between them as a rebalancing and 
an exchange-rate stabilizing mechanism. 
                                                           
8 Keynes’ plan included a number of provisions for discussing measures to restore equilibrium 
when disequilibria surpass the allowed quota. These measures are notably appreciation, 
expansion of domestic demand, reduction of barriers to imports, loans to developing countries, 
and payment of liquid reserves into a Reserve Fund that might finance loans to developing 
countries. 20 
 
sovereign wealth funds when the monetary agreement is signed by representatives of 
both countries involved). The latter solution depending on the US capacity to export 
competitive products in both  manufacturing and high-tech sectors, its actual 
implementation is likely to require much more time than the former solution, which 
would be preferable for adoption as soon as the settlement facility begins operations 
between China and the United States. 
Setting up of this facility would require negotiation of some current thorny 
issues: China and the United States will indeed have to agree on the exchange rate that 
applies initially between the US dollar and the supranational currency unit into which 
the relevant foreign-exchange reserves are converted, once the US–China monetary 
agreement enters into force. The latter would thus need to include an agreement on the 
level of exchange rate between the yuan and the US dollar, setting also the exchange 
rate between each of these national currencies and supranational money. As current 
misalignment between the US dollar and the yuan acts both as an obstacle and an 
incentive to enter such an agreement, exchange-rate negotiations are certainly bound 
to be difficult. However, a process of formal negotiation might allow engaging in a 
broader monetary and economic agreement between the two countries, encompassing 
broader aspects of US–China relations so as to be balanced in a way as to be agreeable 
to both countries, allowing thereby orderly handling of the current deep divergence on 
currency management that is generating strong political tensions between Washington 
and Beijing, and may destabilize markets. 
Internal and external rebalancing mechanisms would work for both countries, 
as the requirement for the US economy to finance all its imports through the export of 
either commercial or financial items will strongly reduce domestic overconsumption, 21 
 
which becomes impossible if the necessary (external) finance is lacking. Analogously, 
the Chinese trade surplus towards the United States will have to be limited to more 
manageable sizes, both because the United States will have to contain its trade deficit 
within affordable and tolerable limits, and also because of the incentives for Chinese 
corporate foreign earnings to be spent on international trade, instead of remaining 
available for external financing of the trade deficit country. This saving will thus be 
available within the domestic economy, making it really possible to increase Chinese 
consumption expenditures and investment on both domestic and foreign products, 
thereby limiting the country’s current account surplus within unproblematic limits on 
a permanent basis. As the level of consumption expenditures in China increases, both 
local consumers and US exporters will have an incentive to get in touch each other, in 
order to have a much wider choice of consumption goods in China and to increase US 
commercial exports towards the latter country. This could lay the proper ground for 
the bilateral monetary agreement between China and the United States to be enlarged 
to other countries shortly, representing de facto the institutional core of a structurally-
reformed international monetary system. The benefits of multilateral trade will indeed 
elicit strong positive incentives for several countries around the world to enter into a 
multilateral monetary agreement shortly after the US–China settlement facility has 
been set up as indicated above. 
Multilateralization of the supranational settlement facility between China and 
the United States would not require institutionalizing  formally  a  joint US–China 
monetary body to operationalize their bilateral monetary agreement. A US–China 
settlement facility could be hosted within the Bretton Woods institutions, in so far as 
the latter will just be keeping the books into which they enter the debits and credits 
resulting from settlement of bilateral trade between these two countries. In that case, 22 
 
the Fed and PBoC would record any incoming or outgoing payments from and to their 
correspondent central bank in the bilateral monetary agreement. In their internal 
department, central banks would record the result of payments for foreign trade in 
their local currency and whose counterparties are local depository institutions, whilst 
the same result would be recorded in USCSCs in their external department, which is 
connected to the settlement facility through a real-time gross-settlement protocol 
similar to those existing in any advanced countries for the settlement of (mostly large-
value) domestic transactions. In recording payments for foreign trade in USCSCs, the 
facility would debit the account of the paying central bank and simultaneously credit 
the account of the receiving central bank, both central bank accounts being kept 
within the facility and whose balances are available for central bank payments only. 
All entries at the settlement facility would be denominated in USCSCs, the 
facility acting as monetary catalyst and keeping the record for all those payments that 
China and the United States carry out for the settlement of their bilateral trade on both 
products and financial markets. While trade deficits will still be possible – but limited 
in their level – they will no longer correspond to payment  deficits (by selling of 
internal denominated-debt instrument). 
Supranational central bank money issued by an international settlement 
institution for any two member countries will increase  stability in  the foreign-
exchange market, and align changes around productivity changes. The clearing of any 
settlement balances being the result of an electronic algorithm running on the 
settlement facility computer, the agreement between the Fed and the PBoC can carry 
it out bilaterally, implementing it via the so-called Payment-versus-Payment (PvP) 
protocol: every time the Fed credits the PBoC for any imported items from China, it 23 
 
debits the PBoC for the simultaneous payment of private or sovereign bonds bought 
by China. Each central bank will be debited as well as credited with the same amount 
of the relevant national currency, which will leave their exchange rates unaffected by 
the operation. This will be enough to avoid the current situation in which a national 
(key) currency, like the US dollar, assumes the role of an object of trade, eliciting 
payment deficits for the net importing country, and contributing thereby to generating 
persistent global imbalances across the world economy. 
5.  Conclusion 
A coordinated external and internal rebalancing of the US and Chinese 
economies will be key for future stability of the global economy. Setting up a bilateral 
settlement facility between China and the United States could constitute a bilateral 
way to avoid further increases in global imbalances and to absorb the huge stock of 
official foreign-exchange reserves accumulated so far by Chinese monetary authorities 
(amounting to 2,399billion US dollars as of end of December 2009). 
The initiative of creating such a settlement facility can be taken by the central 
banks of the countries involved, which are in a technical position to enter into their 
own books the relevant international payments, as far as they agree to adopt the 
Payment-versus-Payment protocol that exists, among others, in the privately-run 
Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) system managed by CLS Bank (based in New 
York) for foreign-exchange market transactions. The minimum technical requirements 
for such a protocol to work properly are as follows: 24 
 
-  distinguishing between domestic and international payments carried out 
through the two central banks, entering all corresponding transactions in 
two functionally-separated accounts in the central banks; 
-  applying the real-time gross-settlement protocol for processing payment 
orders across the borders through the Fed and the PBoC, analogously to 
national central bank’s settlement on domestic interbank markets. 
Setting up a settlement facility for major trading countries would constitute an 
orderly way to rebalancing economic systems in order to avoid further excessive 
global imbalances, which threaten economic and financial stability across the globe. 
Designed to reproduce in the international monetary space the workings of payment 
and settlement systems that exist within national economies, the facility would 
reproduce internationally the following features: (a) double-entry bookkeeping will 
make sure that any country’s purchase is financed through sales on any products or 
financial markets, but not through the issuance of its own currency; (b) the issuance of 
supranational  money as an instantaneous circular flow from and to the institution 
carrying the relevant payment out will make sure that no national currency becomes 
an object of trade; and (c) the explicit distinction between the payments function and 
the financial intermediation activities carried out by settlement institutions will make 
sure that any country pays all its imports finally, so that no payment deficits will occur 
any more in foreign trade. 
It is in the mutual interest of both China and the United States to rebalance the 
bilateral trade flows in order for both of them to make sure that economic growth is as 
robust and sustainable as this is required to avoid another global crisis, and to improve 
the standard of living of their populations. While most analyses recently put forward 25 
 
advocate coordinated rebalancing either through adjustment of relative prices (that is, 
exchange rates) or through adjustments in behavior (reducing US consumption and 
expanding China’s), the current international monetary architecture lacks the means to 
implement such coordinated adjustment. On the other hand, the global excess capacity 
generated in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis is a backdrop 
against which both changes in exchange rates and reduction of US overconsumption 
are bound to generate further destabilizing effects in the global economy. 
This paper has explored the advantages of achieving coordinated adjustment 
through an institutional way. A bilateral settlement facility is a technical construct, 
which could help these countries reaching a long-standing goal, while addressing the 
current political and economic challenges. This might then raise other countries’ self-
interest, and provide the right incentives to some of them to join in what could further 
evolve into a multilateral payment agreement, representing the key stepping stone for 
a structural reform of the international monetary and financial architecture in a not too 
distant future, to the benefit of both global trade (which would thereby increase) and a 
more stable world economy. 
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